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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The rapid growth of health care spending in general, and Medicare spending in particular, poses 
a serious threat to the nation’s economic health.  The most recent projections show that the 
Medicare Hospital Insurance (Part A) Trust Fund will be depleted in 2017 unless actions are 
taken to slow the rate of cost increases, raise revenues, or both.  To address concerns about the 
growth in Medicare spending, numerous solutions have been proposed, including reductions in 
provider payment updates, increases in premiums and cost sharing, and reforms that are designed 
to improve both quality of care and efficiency in the overall health care system.  This paper looks 
beyond savings that could be achieved through reductions in provider payments to focus on some 
of the broader approaches to delivery system reform, considering the hard evidence that has 
accumulated thus far and lessons learned from Medicare demonstrations and other real-world 
studies.  This paper assesses the extent to which proposed reforms are likely to achieve savings 
in the short or long term and change providers’ practices in ways that both reduce beneficiaries’ 
need for expensive services and reduce unnecessary procedures and inefficiencies.
Of the many ideas currently being proposed to reduce Medicare costs, the most popular (aside 
from simply cutting the growth in provider payments) include medical homes, electronic health 
records (EHRs), bundling of payments for episodes of care, accountable health organizations, 
and comparative effectiveness research.   Each of these ideas has merit and presents 
opportunities for savings over the long term.  The pending House of Representatives bill (H.R. 
3200, America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009) includes provisions for pilot programs 
to test accountable health organizations and bundling of payments, as well as the establishment 
of a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Research.  However, the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) ascribes little or no savings to any of these provisions of H.R. 3200 over the next ten 
years, and in all likelihood, these proposals are likely to require more than ten years to generate 
significant savings, although they could have a sizeable impact over the longer term.  The 
rationale behind these proposals and the reasons they are unlikely to reduce costs significantly in 
the next five or ten years include the following: 
y Medical homes have great potential to improve the coordination of care by having 
medical practices serve as the case manager for the patient, not simply the provider of 
treatment.  Some recent evidence from a small pilot test of the Guided Care model 
developed by Chad Boult, which may serve as a model for the medical home, suggests 
that such models could be effective in reducing hospitalizations and Medicare 
expenditures.  However, the Medicare medical homes demonstration program, as 
currently designed, is not likely to achieve near-term savings because it targets too broad 
a range of patients, and dilutes focus on those individuals most in need of a medical 
home.  Also, small practices (for example, those with fewer than five physicians) are 
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unlikely to have enough Medicare patients to support the additional staff required to be 
an effective, fully integrated medical home; this is a concern because more than half of 
all Medicare beneficiaries are served by practices with only one or two physicians.
y Electronic health records could achieve long-term savings by reducing errors and 
redundant testing, but will not be widespread for years.  In physician practices and other 
medical settings where they are implemented, the savings are unlikely to fully offset the 
substantial startup cost for a number of years.   
y Bundling of payments has the potential to reduce costs associated with unnecessary 
hospital readmissions and post-acute care, but may be difficult to implement given the 
ambiguities and tensions regarding what services are to be bundled together, which 
providers (hospitals, skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), home heath agencies, specialists, 
and other physicians) will share in the bundled payment for a particular patient, and how 
payments are to be distributed among them.   
y Accountable health organizations (AHOs) are appealing because they offer the potential 
to give hospitals and physicians financial incentives to work together to provide care 
efficiently by providing a global budget that they would have to operate within based on 
the number and health conditions of their patients.  AHOs are most likely to be 
successful in situations where physicians are salaried, such as Mayo Clinic, Kaiser 
Permanente, or the Geisinger Clinic.  Establishing such organizations would require a 
seismic change in the delivery system, however, and shifting physicians into such 
arrangements nationwide would be logistically, politically, and legally challenging, if 
not impossible.  
y Comparative effectiveness studies could provide valuable information in guiding 
treatment decisions toward the most effective products, procedures, and tests.  However, 
results of these studies are unlikely to produce savings unless Medicare takes them into 
account when making coverage determinations or beneficiaries incur higher out-of-
pocket costs for non-optimal treatments.  Rigorous designs, which may take longer to 
implement than cruder approaches, are essential for such analyses to avoid potential 
misinformation. 
Despite this relatively bleak assessment for savings in the near term from some current popular 
proposals, there are two promising types of interventions for which there is solid evidence 
already available that they could generate such savings.  In addition, another intervention for 
which no such rigorous evidence yet exists warrants special attention because of its enormous 
potential for addressing a root cause of much of the inefficiency in Medicare.  The two most 
promising areas for reducing Medicare costs in the near term, based on hard evidence, are efforts 
to reduce the need for hospitalizations among beneficiaries with the most serious chronic 
illnesses and models to reduce hospital readmissions rates.  The intervention with the potential 
to generate even larger savings is reducing disparities across physicians and geographic areas 
in care delivery, utilization, and expenditures.  Attempts to accomplish such reductions within 
health plans or clinics have met with limited success to date, so this suggestion lacks the hard 
evidence to support it that the other two approaches have.  Nonetheless, the rapid response of 
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hospitals to DRGs (diagnosis-related groups) as part of Medicare’s hospital prospective payment 
system shows that providers can respond rapidly to strong financial incentives.  Furthermore, the 
potential to link payments to efficient performance suggests that this as-yet-unproven approach 
could result in major savings if providers are only paid for efficient levels of care. 
New evidence from the Medicare Coordinated Care demonstration offers the promise of 
net Medicare savings, and the potential for reducing hospitalizations, for a well-defined 
population and a well-designed intervention.  Beneficiaries with congestive heart failure, 
coronary artery disease, or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease who were hospitalized in the 
past year, or individuals with any chronic illness and multiple hospitalizations in the past two 
years can benefit from nurse-led coordination interventions.  Interventions with well-designed 
features that are targeted towards these beneficiaries can reduce hospitalizations by nine percent 
to 24 percent.  This population encompasses 18 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries, and 
accounts for 38 percent of all Medicare expenditures in the year after they meet the eligibility 
criteria (and one-third of all Medicare costs for the next three years); this intervention could 
generate net savings of $30 billion or more over 10 years.1
Rigorous, published studies show that hospital readmissions can be reduced substantially if 
a detailed protocol for transitional care is followed.  Both Mary Naylor and Eric Coleman 
have shown in multiple studies that their transitional care interventions substantially and 
significantly reduce the high short-term re-hospitalization rate (20 percent) for Medicare patients. 
The two interventions differ in their approaches; Coleman focuses on coaching patients and 
families to self-manage, while Naylor takes a nurse-directed approach.  Both, however, have 
proven to be successful; Coleman reduced hospital costs by 19 percent for patients with a range 
of chronic illnesses over a six-month follow-up period, and Naylor reduced the number of 
hospital re-admissions by 34 percent and total Medicare expenditures by 39 percent for CHF 
patients over a 12-month follow-up period. 
Reducing geographic disparities has a much larger potential payoff than the proven 
interventions—researchers have shown that reducing Medicare spending in all areas to 
that of the most efficient areas would reduce total Medicare spending by 30 percent.2
While no policy to induce these reductions nationally has been tested, and evidence from 
previous studies on reducing such practice differences within health plans is mixed,3 the Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has put the infrastructure in place that could make it 
possible to do so.  CMS’s Resource Use Reporting (RUR) project is piloting a methodology to 
provide Medicare physicians with reports that compare the Medicare resources used for their 
own patients to those expended for similar patients of other physicians locally and nationally, 
adjusted for differences in patient case mix and prices.  This project will, for the first time, show 
physicians how their own prescribed care and referral patterns compare to others.  If payment 
changes are made that reward only efficient levels of care, the savings could be significant.
Furthermore, this approach could work within the current structure in which most physicians are 
not salaried employees of large systems such as Kaiser or Geisinger. 
The following list outlines several steps that could be taken to reduce the growth in Medicare 
spending in the next five to ten years.  The list starts with suggestions based on strong evidence 
that has been generated from the Medicare Coordinated Care demonstrations and the 
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Naylor/Coleman studies, then moves on to include: (1) the potential for achieving savings from 
reductions in wide variations in provider practices, (2) a model for ensuring that the search for 
effectiveness will be an ongoing effort, (3) reaping savings in the Medicare Advantage program, 
where the incentives and structure to foster efficient health care delivery are already in place, and 
(4) building the infrastructure for savings in future decades.  Each suggestion is based on giving 
providers and patients more information about what constitutes better and more efficient care, 
and establishing incentives for providers to practice more efficiently. 
Build on Demonstrated Success of Models that Achieve Savings Through Care Coordination 
and Reductions in Hospitalizations and Readmissions 
y Implement a large, broad-based coordinated care pilot to test whether other 
organizations can achieve the same success as the effective demonstration sites, using 
the intervention protocols those sites have followed and refined over the past seven 
years.  Use the findings from the pilot to establish a permanent care coordination benefit 
under Medicare for providers who can and will implement these proven protocols. 
y Modify the Medicare “medical home” demonstration so that it is targeted to only the 
subset of beneficiaries most likely to benefit from care coordination (that is, those 
identified in the Coordinated Care Demonstration noted above for beneficiaries with 
chronic illnesses).  Require that medical homes incorporate the lessons learned from the 
demonstration on how to implement an effective care coordination intervention and 
lessons from the literature about effective transitional care and patient self-management 
education.
y Vary the base rate paid to hospitals for Medicare admissions to reward those with low 
case-mix adjusted readmission rates and penalize those with high case mix-adjusted 
readmission rates.  (H.R. 3200 includes a similar provision; CBO estimates that this 
would generate savings of $19 billion over the next 10 years.)  Provide guidance to 
hospitals on how to achieve lower readmission rates, by feeding back data analyses to 
diagnose the major sources of the high rates, as well as referring the hospitals to experts 
who have developed and tested effective transitional care interventions. 
Use the Infrastructure Developed for Comparing Provider Efficiency to Educate and Motivate 
Physicians
y Refine and extend the RUR program.  Include quality of care indicators that have clear 
and near-term cost implications.  Publicize the aggregate findings annually to show 
differences in levels and trends across and within geographic areas.  Develop and 
publicize plans to base physician payments on their efficiency and quality measures.  
After two years of dissemination and refinement, tie physician payments to their RUR 
ratings and quality of care. 
Establish an Environment that Stimulates an Ongoing Search for Greater Efficiency 
y Maintain an ongoing “learning laboratory” of care coordination programs to conduct 
rapid turnaround testing of variations in the proven interventions to increase the impacts 
on hospitalizations or lower the cost of the effective care coordination interventions.
vy Publicize “best practices” and lessons learned at regular intervals in a visible, timely, 
and accessible forum, so that ongoing learning and improvement occurs at all levels. 
y Conduct rigorous studies wherever possible to compare the relative effectiveness of 
alternative interventions that vary substantially in their costs.  Use large enough samples 
where possible to examine subgroups of patients and assess variations in what works 
best for different types of individuals.
y Continue to seek ways to improve end-of-life care to maximize the comfort and quality 
of life in those last months for terminally ill patients and their families, while limiting 
the use of expensive procedures and treatments that have no potential to meaningfully 
increase survival time or quality of life. 
Reinstate Incentives for Efficient Provision of Care in the Medicare Advantage (MA) Program 
y Capture savings from managed care’s potential efficiencies by forcing real and fair 
competition with traditional fee-for-service Medicare.  Initially designed to reform 
incentives in the health care system to achieve greater efficiencies and improve patient 
care at a lower cost to the Medicare program, Medicare now overpays private plans 
under the Medicare Advantage plan by an estimated 14 percent, on average.  Short-term 
savings could be achieved by reducing Medicare Advantage plans’ capitation payments 
to 98 percent of what beneficiaries would be expected to cost had they been in 
Medicare’s traditional fee-for-service (FFS) arrangement, thus returning the Medicare 
Advantage program to its conceptual origins as a strategy to promote better and more 
efficiently managed care.  (H.R. 3200 would phase down payments to 100 percent of 
expected FFS expenditures to achieve savings of $156 billion over ten years.)
Build the Infrastructure Needed for Longer Term Improvements in Efficiency and Quality 
y Continue to move forward with electronic health records development, building on 
findings from the Medicare demonstrations.  
Policymakers have strong interest in reducing the rate of growth in health care spending and in 
using Medicare to lead the way in delivery system reform.  They now have the opportunity to 
adopt reforms that are likely to achieve savings in the relatively near term by reducing costs for 
the highest-risk beneficiaries, giving hospitals financial incentives to lower their readmission 
rates, and by giving physicians specific information about their performance and tying 
reimbursement rates to the efficiency of their practices.  While there is no guarantee that 
interventions and programs found to be successful in demonstrations or small experiments will 
be equally successful when implemented more broadly, the evidence that the changes suggested 
above will begin to bend the cost curve within the next five to ten years is stronger than for any 
of the other proposals under consideration.  Controlling health care costs over the longer term 
will require ongoing efforts to develop, test, and implement new strategies that are proven to 
improve both the efficiency and the quality of care.  
1STRATEGIES FOR REINING IN MEDICARE SPENDING
THROUGH DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORMS:  
ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE AND OPPORTUNITIES  
As President Obama has made clear, reducing the rate of increase in medical spending is critical 
to the nation’s economic health and to the ability to provide coverage to all Americans.  Any 
effort to bring costs under control must involve the Medicare program, given that it accounts for 
a large share of the federal budget, and that Medicare policy exerts a strong influence on the 
health care sector in general.  Thus, reducing the rate of increase in per beneficiary Medicare 
expenditures is critical.  The focus of this paper is on how best to do that through delivery system 
reforms, and how to achieve some savings as quickly as possible. 
The most recent projections show that the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust Fund will have 
insufficient funds to pay full benefits beginning in 2017 unless something is done to slow the rate 
of cost increases.  Looking into the future, it will be critical to slow the growth in spending per 
person as the number of beneficiaries grows.  The challenge will be to identify policies and 
programmatic changes that will achieve the promise of moderating costs.  Numerous solutions 
have been proposed, including reductions in provider payment updates, increases in premiums 
and cost sharing, and reforms that are designed to improve both quality of care and efficiency in 
the overall health care system.  This paper looks beyond savings through payment updates to 
focus on some of the broader approaches to delivery system reform, considering the hard 
evidence that has accumulated thus far and lessons learned from Medicare demonstrations and 
other real-world studies.
Despite claims to the contrary, it is exceedingly difficult to identify interventions and policy 
changes that reform practice patterns and actually reduce costs.  Reducing costs by cutting the 
growth in Medicare payment rates can achieve savings and put needed pressure on providers to 
encourage greater efficiency; however, this can be politically difficult, as witnessed by 
Congress’s annual overrides of the legislatively-mandated reduction in payment rates for 
physician services to offset volume increases.  Other reforms can be successful, but are not 
always easy to replicate without eroding savings or diminishing the intervention’s ability to 
achieve its full potential savings.  Furthermore, policy changes that constrain choices, increase 
out-of-pocket costs for consumers, or reduce revenue for specific providers could engender a 
political backlash that could inhibit cost control efforts. 
Consider first one of the success stories, which illustrates the power of properly targeted 
financial incentives applied in a relatively straightforward manner.  When hospitals were paid on 
a per diem basis (prior to 1983), Medicare stays averaged about 10 days per admission, declining 
gradually by an average of 0.26 days per year over the 16 years from 1967 to 1983.  In the first 
full year that Medicare payment to hospitals was set at a fixed (risk-adjusted) amount per 
admission (the prospective payment system, or PPS), average length of stay declined by more 
than a full day, from 9.7 days in 1983 to 8.6 days in 1984.4  Since that change, lengths of stay 
have continued to decline, but at a slower rate (0.15 days per year), to 5.9 days per stay in 2002.
The remarkable one-year decline when PPS was first introduced was achieved despite the rapidly 
growing substitution of outpatient surgeries for inpatient stays, which removed some of the 
2shorter stays from the calculation of the inpatient mean.  As a consequence, Medicare saved 
money as it ratcheted down the base payment rate for a hospital stay over time.  Meanwhile, the 
proportion of beneficiaries admitted to a hospital in a year has stayed remarkably constant, at 
about 20 percent.  While the rapid decline in length of stay raised concerns that patients were 
being prematurely discharged, resulting in poorer outcomes and higher hidden costs due to 
readmissions, research found no concurrent problems with increasing complications or 
readmissions. 
Contrast this experience with that of introducing private managed care plans, such as health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs), to Medicare (the program now called Medicare Advantage).
The concept sounded promising—give a fixed monthly payment per member to plans that have 
control over which physicians and hospitals their members can use and what (and how) they pay 
these providers for services, and let the plans decide how to deliver services efficiently to 
maximize their profits, as they do with their commercial clients.  Payments were set at 95 percent 
of the actuarial projections of costs for beneficiaries of comparable age, sex, and institutional 
status so that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) would reap some of the cost 
savings from the plans’ more efficient production of health care.  Beneficiaries joined HMOs, 
despite some loss of control over their provider selection, because some of the plan’s savings 
were passed back to them in the form of lower premiums than the beneficiary would have to pay 
for Medicare supplemental coverage (Medigap) and/or more extensive coverage than under 
traditional Medicare (such as coverage of prescription drugs prior to the introduction of Part D, 
eyeglasses or dental care, or elimination of deductibles).  Unfortunately, what could have been a 
cost-saving innovation actually increased total Medicare spending, because the HMOs attracted a 
healthier mix of enrollees than average, which the crude risk adjustment strategy used in the 
1980s and 1990s did not adequately control for. Congress took over a decade to phase in a more 
accurate risk adjuster, despite repeated evidence showing this favorable selection was resulting 
in overpayments to HMOs rather than savings to Medicare.5  In addition, over the past 8 years 
Congress legislated substantially higher payments to HMOs and other Medicare Advantage plans 
than Medicare would have incurred had the beneficiaries remained in traditional fee-for-service 
(FFS) Medicare. 
It is obviously important to proceed with policies based on strong evidence that a new 
intervention will be effective in achieving savings—and doesn’t cost more than it saves—before 
implementing a new nationwide strategy.  To its credit, CMS did exactly that with commercial 
disease management programs, investing in demonstrations that ultimately showed the flaws and 
ineffectiveness of these models while holding the programs at financial risk for generating the 
savings required to cover their fees.6  CMS also tested a telemedicine program for diabetics that 
produced some modest improvements in clinical quality-of-care indicators, but at a great cost 
and without reductions in hospitalizations.7  These demonstrations ultimately saved millions of 
dollars by helping CMS decide not to implement expensive but ineffective approaches that had 
been touted as generating enormous savings and were widely used in commercial settings. 
The current risk is that in responding to the urgent call for cost-saving reforms, policymakers 
will adopt well-intended but unproven methods of reducing healthcare costs.  To put Medicare 
on a more solid footing, policymakers could focus on two types of changes in the near future: (1) 
those with the greatest likelihood of producing meaningful savings in the near term (the next 
3three to five years), and (2) those that will create the foundation over the next few years for 
lowering the growth rate of costs further into the future.  The discussion below first describes 
why many of the most talked-about current ideas are unlikely to reduce costs in the near term, 
then assesses the best short-run savings opportunities, and concludes with suggestions for how to 
achieve these savings over both the short and long run. 
What are the current popular ideas for generating cost savings for Medicare, 
and are they likely to achieve savings in the near term? 
Several ideas and models are currently being discussed to reduce health care costs in general and 
Medicare costs in particular, and are getting a significant amount of attention in recent health reform 
discussions.  The pending House of Representatives bill, America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 
2009 (H.R. 3200), for example, includes several provisions designed to generate savings and improve 
quality, including pilot programs to test Accountable Health Organizations, bundling of post-hospital 
care, and the establishment of a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Research.  While all have 
promise, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scoring of H.R. 3200 ascribes little or no savings to 
any of these ideas over the next ten years.  In all likelihood, these proposals will require more than ten 
years to generate significant savings, although they could have a sizable impact over the longer term.     
Medical homes. The concept of medical homes is that (virtually) all Medicare beneficiaries would be 
connected to a physician practice that would be responsible for coordinating their care.  CMS’s 
demonstration of this concept is currently under review by the Office of Management and Budget.  To 
cover the cost of this coordination effort, monthly capitation payments will be made to practices 
serving as medical homes for patients, with the amount of these payments for a given patient in a 
given practice falling into one of four categories.  Assignment to categories depends on (1) whether 
the patient’s projected future Medicare expenditures exceeds a pre-specified threshold (as determined 
by a risk score calculated from diagnoses for which the patient had been treated prior to enrollment), 
and (2) the comprehensiveness and sophistication of the practice’s medical home features. 
While the concept of medical homes is appealing because it promotes greater coordination of 
care, it is not without practical challenges:
y The medical home model is not designed for small practices: practices with one or two 
physicians would not typically have enough high-risk patients to support a full-time care 
coordinator.
y Medical homes are targeted too broadly to achieve savings that exceed costs.  As 
currently designed, over 80 percent of a typical physician’s Medicare patients would be 
included in the demonstration, but only about one-fourth of these patients will be at high 
risk of hospitalization in the next year or two, or in need of the type of coordination 
expected of a medical home.  Thus, much of the monthly payments will be for patients 
who do not need the intervention, while the amount being considered for those who are 
high risk may not be adequate to provide the necessary services.  By refocusing 
attention, and payment, on beneficiaries with chronic conditions, the program will have 
substantially greater likelihood of generating savings in the next few years that are large 
enough to offset program costs.  
4y The medical home demonstration design specifies a number of requirements, but the 
requirements do not indicate how effective care coordination would be implemented, 
and thus are not likely to produce the kinds of changes that lead to reductions in 
expensive hospital care.  The discussion below on findings from the Coordinated Care 
demonstration illustrates the importance of implementation details in distinguishing 
effective from ineffective care coordination programs.  The Guided Care model 
developed by Chad Boult provides such details and has great promise for medical 
homes, but raises concerns about whether the cost of the multi-disciplinary team it 
engages in patient care will outweigh any savings generated (new evidence on this is 
emerging).8
Electronic health records (EHRs).  Virtually everyone believes that having electronic health 
records that are readily accessible to all physicians who treat a given patient would reduce 
medical errors and redundant testing and improve adherence to evidence-based medicine, 
resulting in lower costs.  The records would contain information from all patient encounters with 
the medical system, and would include symptoms, test results, diagnoses, and prescribed 
medications and self-care regimens.  Costs could be saved by avoiding redundant testing, 
minimizing the likelihood of harmful drug interactions or conflicting care regimens, 
recommending a course of treatment for a patient (based on their characteristics, symptoms, and 
history), and documenting the rationale for deviations from guidelines. 
Electronic health records are badly needed, but it is widely believed that any favorable effect 
they may have on total health care costs will not be realized for many years.  The experience 
Kaiser Permanente has had with its system supports this view9: while Kaiser Permanente 
experienced reductions of 25 percent and 21 percent, respectively, in the rate of primary care and 
specialty care office visits between 2004 and 2007 in their Hawaii region, emergency department 
visits rose by 11 percent over the same time period.  Furthermore, savings from reductions in 
office visits are offset somewhat by an eight-fold increase in scheduled telephone visits, and a 
six-fold increase in secure email messaging, leading to an eight percent increase in the total 
number of ambulatory contacts.  Additional time is required to document patient visits.  Thus, 
while there may be some savings to Kaiser and improvement of quality of care attributable to 
electronic health records, the savings are not likely to be large enough to offset the large initial 
investment ($4 billion) and maintenance costs for many years, if ever.10
Bundling hospital and post-acute payments for episodes of care.  This approach is designed to 
improve transitions from one care setting to another, primarily from an acute care hospital to a 
rehabilitation hospital, skilled nursing facility, or home health care.  Furthermore, all providers 
would be involved in an episode focused on the goal of providing the whole package of services 
as efficiently as possible.  This would be accomplished by providing a bundled payment for the 
episode of care to be divided up among the providers involved; the various actors would be 
responsible for splitting up the payment.  H.R. 3200 contains provisions for bundling payments.  
Under this model, hospitals would receive an augmented pre-set amount per admission and 
would be responsible for all hospital and post-acute care provided by home health agencies, 
skilled nursing facilities, and rehabilitation hospitals and clinics during a fixed period of time 
after hospital discharge (for example, 30 days). 
5Bundling of payments appropriately refocuses incentives on providing more efficient care than 
on just providing more care, and provides incentives to look beyond individual silos in medical 
care.  Nevertheless, this approach seems fraught with practical difficulties of implementation—
who has the power in these arrangements?  Will hospitals use their market power and greater 
resources to drive smaller post-acute providers out of business or take them over?  Can the 
smaller payment amount that is to be divided be allocated in a fashion that is acceptable to all 
providers whose compensation is included in the bundled payment?  
Pay-for-performance.  This popular payment reform model ties compensation to the quality 
rather than the quantity of care.  As attractive as it sounds, however, it will not necessarily save 
money and may well increase costs, because the incentive is solely to improve quality of care, 
without regard to cost.  Better quality can lead to lower costs, but does not necessarily do so, 
especially given the wide range of indicators used to assess what constitutes better quality.  For 
example, some indicators focus on screening tests or preventive care, which are valuable for the 
patients’ long-term health, but increases in these rates are more likely to increase spending than 
to lower it in the next ten years, or longer.
Accountable health organizations (AHOs)/Accountable care organizations (ACOs). This
approach merits special discussion, given the attention generated in policy circles by the widely 
read and cited New Yorker article by Dr. Atul Gawande.11  The article suggests that community 
stakeholders—hospitals, medical groups, home health agencies, consumer groups, insurers, and 
others—should form a collaboration and be held jointly accountable for the performance of the 
local health care system.  Elliot Fisher and colleagues at Dartmouth suggest that such 
organizations hold substantial promise for improving quality and lowering the cost of care.
Under their model, the AHO would be led by a local hospital, which would receive a single 
capitation payment for each patient, and would be responsible for allocating the money across 
the physicians and other providers in a manner that yields the most efficient overall care.  While 
providers would still receive fee-for-service payments for services, by having bonuses paid for 
efficiency the model reduces the incentive for providers to maximize the amount of services they 
render or to shift costs.12
As posed, the model appears to be much like an HMO, but without any real authority.  Medicare 
Advantage plans (HMOs and PPOs) have generally shown themselves to be poor role models for 
efficiency or delivering higher quality than fee-for-service, despite the appeal of having one 
entity being responsible for delivery of the full range of health care services to a defined 
population of patients.  Other forms of Medicare Advantage plans, such as private fee-for-service 
(PFFS) plans, are even less efficient.13  Furthermore, the logistics of how such a system would or 
could work anywhere, except perhaps in a small community where physicians are salaried (and 
therefore have no financial incentive to overuse services), are unclear.  As Fisher and colleagues 
note, there are significant cultural, legal, and practical obstacles to this model.  Saving money 
will require reducing hospital use and unnecessary services provided by physicians; the pie has 
to shrink.  Battle lines will quickly form on which provider’s piece will take the biggest hit, and 
it is unclear who will wield the actual authority in making those decisions.  The failure of HMOs 
to achieve similar promise should be a warning sign, and how accountable health organizations 
will avoid the same fate is unclear.   
6The most prominent example of accountable health organizations, the Community Care of North 
Carolina (CCNC) program, purports to generate large savings for the state’s Medicaid program.  
However, studies showing such savings have not been published, and the documents available on 
the CCNC website that describe the methods provide far too little detail to assess the validity of 
the savings estimates, or their generalizability to the Medicare population (see Appendix A for a 
more detailed discussion of the CCNC evaluations).  The CCNC program has a number of 
desirable features and may be a reasonable model to pursue in some parts of the country, and is 
relatively inexpensive.  But there is little credible evidence of what savings would actually be 
achieved, if any.  Furthermore, a recently released analysis of the data for CCNC estimates that 
the program actually increased costs by $400 million in 2006, rather than reducing them by the 
$300 million that year, as estimated by Mercer.14  Thus, caution should be exercised before 
touting this model as a source of great savings. 
Comparative effectiveness research. Comparative effectiveness is a broad term that is used 
differently by different people, but in general means building an evidence base that would enable 
providers and insurers to determine the most efficacious and cost-effective treatments and 
medications.  Some advocates of such research suggest that it could help providers identify 
which treatments are most likely to be successful for any given patient with particular 
characteristics, symptoms, or history, at any particular point in time.  
Comparative effectiveness research will be extremely valuable in some situations, such as head-
to-head tests of a new, expensive drug against an established lower-cost alternative for a 
particular illness or symptom.  However, it is far more complex and limited than many of the 
claims that are being made for it.  Even in this most straightforward of cases, clinical trials are 
needed to test the medications adequately for efficacy and safety.  Use of registries to conduct 
the analyses would be fraught with severe selection bias problems, and would be of little value 
for determining the optimal medication for a particular patient, given the myriad of patient 
characteristics that could influence a drug’s effectiveness.  These problems would be far more 
serious for testing treatments other than drugs, because even more factors affect their likelihood 
of success. 
Moreover, even if comparative effectiveness tests are conducted rigorously, legislative changes 
will be needed for them to have much impact.  Current Medicare regulations require that any 
treatment shown to be effective cannot be denied to beneficiaries, regardless of cost.  The 
prospect of limiting beneficiaries’ access to particular treatments that are more costly than an 
alternative one that is equally effective on average has raised important concerns that people 
who are not responsive to the less expensive treatment or medication will not have access to 
alternative treatments that may be effective for them, or will have to pay much more out of 
pocket for such treatment.  Physicians, lawmakers, and patient advocacy groups have expressed 
concerns about taking treatment decisions out of the hands of physicians and patients by denying 
Medicare payments.  These concerns could be addressed by allowing exceptions when the most 
cost-efficient treatment is shown to be inefficient or contra-indicated for a particular patient. 
7Do any interventions offer potential savings in the next five to ten years? 
This somewhat discouraging assessment of the likelihood that the most prominent suggestions 
for saving money through system reforms will actually do so any time soon does not mean that 
there are no alternatives.  The areas that seem to have the greatest potential for generating 
savings in the short run are reducing the need for hospitalizations among beneficiaries with 
serious chronic conditions, reducing the hospital readmissions rate, and reducing the 
enormous disparities across physicians in resource use and costs of care, which do not 
correlate at all with differences in quality of care.
Compelling evidence exists now on what interventions do or do not generate savings for high-risk 
patients by reducing their need for hospitalizations and for short-term readmissions.  The studies also 
show to whom such programs should be targeted to achieve these savings in the very near term.  
There is also strong evidence that large disparities in efficiency exist between physicians, both within 
and among geographic areas, but there is little evidence on what interventions would be effective in 
changing those practices.  Nonetheless, the potential savings are very large if physicians were paid 
only for an efficient level of care, and not for redundant or unnecessary services they provide. Solving
each of these problems will require two factors:  (1) giving information to providers (including 
physicians, hospitals, health plans, and care coordination programs) on what works, and (2) 
implementing payment changes that incorporate financial incentives for providers to adopt these more 
effective and cost-efficient practices.  Reducing hospitalizations for the chronically ill will also require 
a new care coordination benefit that is tightly defined and targeted.  The discussion below describes 
how these most promising areas might generate savings in the relatively near term. 
Reducing Hospitalizations and Readmissions for Beneficiaries with Chronic Illnesses  
The first area with major savings potential is in improving care for beneficiaries with chronic 
illnesses, specifically focusing on rates of hospitalization.  A frequently cited statistic is that the 
five percent of patients with the highest costs account for 50 percent of all Medicare costs in a 
year.  This estimate is dramatic but difficult to use in policy formulation, because the five percent 
subgroup of beneficiaries cannot be identified in advance.  Furthermore, many of these patients 
in this top group received expensive but life-extending procedures like organ transplants or 
bypass surgery.  Few, if any, policymakers would advocate eliminating coverage of such services 
to cut costs.  Another measure indicating that patients treated for five or more chronic conditions 
in a given year account for 20 percent of Medicare beneficiaries but 65 percent of all Medicare 
costs is also somewhat misleading for guiding policy decisions, because it substantially 
overstates the share of costs that these beneficiaries will account for in future years. 
It is possible, however, to identify (1) some important patient target groups based on their diagnoses 
and service use in one year who will account for a disproportionate share of costs in the next several 
years, and (2) interventions that have generated sizable reductions in their hospitalizations and costs in 
multiple settings.  This group of beneficiaries represents the greatest target of opportunity for 
Medicare cost savings in the short run.  The most promising interventions for which hard evidence 
(that is, randomized clinical trials) exists are patient self-management programs, certain coordinated 
care programs staffed by nurses, and transitional care programs.15
8Kate Lorig and John Wheeler have both developed patient self-management programs, which 
train patients and their families to manage the patient’s care, and to talk to their physicians 
effectively to get the information they need.16  Their programs have not focused primarily on 
Medicare beneficiaries, but have shown sizeable reductions in hospitalizations and costs in 
randomized trials of adult patients with chronic illness.  The programs provided weekly group 
sessions led by health educators over a four- to seven-week period.  Topics included exercise, 
symptom management, fatigue and sleep management, use of medications, and problem solving. 
While large-scale commercial disease management companies have been unsuccessful in 
reducing hospitalizations and costs for Medicare beneficiaries in the fee-for-service sector, 
several smaller, nurse-led local care coordination programs have been shown in 15 rigorous, 
long-running randomized trials to generate such savings for a group of high-risk, high-severity 
patients with chronic illnesses.17  A study of this approach shows that four different types of 
organizations (an urban academic medical center, an integrated delivery system in a rural area, a 
hospice agency, and a quality improvement provider) each were able to reduce the number of 
hospitalizations for a high-risk group by nine percent to 24 percent over an average follow-up 
period of three years.  The high-risk group, comprised of beneficiaries with heart disease or 
pulmonary disease and a hospitalization over the prior 12 months, plus beneficiaries with any of 
12 chronic illnesses and two or more hospitalizations in the previous two years, includes about 
18 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries.  This group, when identified from claims data for a 
given calendar year, accounts for over one-third of all Medicare spending over the three 
subsequent calendar years. 
The findings from the 15 coordinated care demonstrations demonstrate the importance of 
appropriate targeting and enable policymakers to identify some operational features that 
distinguish the eight programs that were unable to reduce hospitalizations from the four that 
succeeded (the other three programs enrolled too few patients to evaluate).  The reduced 
hospitalization reductions in the effective programs were driven by the programs’ success with 
patients who had high-risk and high-severity conditions, as evidenced by a relatively recent 
hospitalization or repeated hospitalizations, as described above.  Features of the successful 
programs that differentiated them from the less successful ones include: 
y They developed a strong rapport with patients through frequent (approximately once 
every four to six weeks) in-person contact with the patients, in addition to telephone 
contacts.
y They developed a strong working relationship and trust with the patients’ primary 
care physicians, either through being co-located with them, having a prior working 
relationship with them, attending some of the patient’s visits to the physician, seeing 
the physician during hospital rounds, or other ways of having informal face-to-face 
contact with the physician.  In addition, successful programs tended to try to assign 
the same care coordinator to all of a physician’s patients who were in the program. 
y They had timely information on hospitalizations and emergency room visits, enabling 
them to provide extra attention to patients at a time of crisis in their health care. This 
attention could help patients reduce their likelihood of being readmitted by educating 
them about how to take their medications and follow physicians’ recommendations 
9for post-discharge activities and self-care, helping them make and keep follow-up 
visits in the weeks after discharge, and helping them understand how their own 
behavior may have contributed to their need for the hospitalization and how to avoid 
such problems in the future. 
y They had strong medication management interventions that monitored patients for 
adverse reactions to their medications, checked for redundant or conflicting 
prescriptions, and tracked patients’ filling of prescriptions to ensure they were 
renewed on a timely basis. 
y They had strong self-care education programs, focused on helping patients’ identify 
early warning signs and know when to call their physician, understand how to take 
their medications and adhere to their other self-care regimens, and overcome barriers 
to adherence. 
y They provided social support services to patients who needed them, when they 
needed them.  These services included not only transportation assistance and meals, 
but also help in identifying and dealing with depression and isolation. 
y They served as a communications hub between patients and providers.  In practice, 
this typically meant making sure that a patient’s numerous physicians all had a 
complete list of the patient’s medications and any changes made, providing hospital 
staff with relevant patient information upon admission, serving as a liaison between 
hospital discharge planners and the patient, and making sure that tests recommended 
by evidence-based guidelines were ordered on schedule and that providers had the 
results when they saw the patient. 
To address the problem of short-term hospital readmissions, Mary Naylor and Eric Coleman have 
both developed highly effective, proven programs that use advance practice nurses to help 
hospitalized Medicare patients reduce their probability of readmission.  This is a major source of 
potential savings for Medicare, since 20 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries discharged from a 
hospital are readmitted within 30 days, often for problems that could have been prevented with 
adequate post-discharge care, coaching, and monitoring of the patient.18  Naylor’s approach, used for 
congestive heart failure (CHF) patients, is a highly protocol-driven, nurse-directed approach, with the 
intervention occurring over a three-month period following discharge.19  Coleman’s approach, which 
has been used primarily in managed care settings, relies on coaching patients and their families during 
the 30 days after discharge in how to manage their own post-acute care.20
H.R. 3200 contains a measure related to reducing hospital readmissions, but does not reward hospitals 
with low readmission rates, is limited to readmissions only after hospitalizations for one of only three 
selected diagnoses (until 2017, when it increases to seven conditions), and the reduction in the base 
rate is limited to one percent in 2012, two percent in 2013, and tops out at five percent in 2015 and 
thereafter.  The payment reduction factor is equal to the ratio of payments for “excess” readmissions 
(the amount in excess of what will be predicted from a model, based on their patients’ characteristics),
divided by total payments for Medicare hospitalizations.  This provision seems more limited than 
necessary and greatly restricts the potential savings, and also does not encourage hospitals that would 
not experience a penalty to reduce their readmissions.  The payment reduction should vary with the 
readmission rate and be set such that a hospital that reduces its readmission rate below a target rate 
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(e.g., below the median) would not suffer any loss in Medicare revenue relative to being at the target 
rate, whereas hospitals that were above the target rate have a payment-rate reduction that ensures that 
they receive no more total revenue than if their patients had readmission rates equal to the median rate.  
The median and the target rate should consistently decline over time until reaching a level that 
represents highly efficient care.  Thus, hospitals with low readmission rates have an incentive to 
continue findings ways to reduce preventable readmissions, while hospitals with high readmission 
rates do not profit from this behavior.
Reducing Regional Disparities Across Physicians and Areas in Efficiency and Quality 
The Dartmouth group, led by John Wennberg and others, has shown repeatedly that costs are far 
higher in some areas than others, with no corresponding increase in quality for the added resources 
(and sometimes poorer quality).21  Furthermore, as the recent Gawande article points out, most 
physicians have little or no awareness of how their practice patterns differ from their peers.  If 
physicians are shown how their care differs from that provided by the most efficient physicians on the 
use of inpatient versus outpatient treatment for specific diagnoses and procedures, use of specialists, 
use of home health care, use of high-cost procedures and tests, and other actionable factors, physicians 
could begin to understand how they might change their prescribing and treatment practices without 
harming their patients.   
Some physicians, however, deliberately practice in ways that are inefficient because it is financially 
beneficial to them to do so.  Excessive use of MRIs and other imaging devices they own, referral 
arrangements with specialists, pressure from hospitals where they have admitting privileges to admit 
patients when outpatient care would suffice, performing more lucrative treatment options, (e.g., 
implanting stents instead of trying pharmaceutical solutions), and other treatment choices made by 
physicians may increase their income but have little or no beneficial effect for their patients over less 
costly treatment options.  For these physicians, simply knowing that their practice patterns are more 
costly than those of other physicians for similar patients is not likely to change their behavior.  Thus, 
Medicare needs to pay physicians according to how close they are to that high efficiency standard, so 
that all physicians have an incentive to change.  If improved tools, such as electronic health records 
and software that suggests evidence-based treatment, accompany this incentive, substantial 
improvements in efficacy could be achieved. 
One of the largest and most promising efforts to lay the groundwork for reducing inter- and intra-
geographic area differences in efficiency is CMS’s Resource Use Reporting (RUR) project, under 
which all Medicare physicians in the country will receive a report showing how the costs of their own 
Medicare patients per episode of care for particular chronic illnesses compare to that of other 
physicians in their market area, their state, and nationally.  The cost estimates are risk adjusted for 
differences in patient severity levels.  This project will give physicians their first glimpse of how they 
perform relative to their peers, both locally and nationally.  The current effort is a reporting exercise to 
inform physicians of the disparities. 
A pilot study for a limited set of physicians is currently in progress to test the reliability, validity, 
stability, and acceptability of these efficiency and quality measures.  Once CMS has sufficient 
confidence in the measures, it will consider calculating and providing to each physician his or 
her efficiency ratings and quality of care measures.  Each physician will receive a report showing 
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the average Medicare expenditures for their patients with selected conditions, and their relative 
efficiency in percentile terms.  The reports show comparisons not only on total costs (using 
standardized prices to account for inter- and intra-area variations in unit costs), but on use of 
particular services, including hospitalizations and hospital days, skilled nursing facilities, home 
heath care, emergency rooms, and other services, including imaging and durable medical 
equipment.  CMS’s tentative schedule calls for an expanded pilot test including up to 80,000 
physicians in July 2010.  No timetable has yet been set for generating these estimates for all 
Medicare physicians, but it appears to be feasible to do by 2012. 
The methodology is not perfect—physicians and researchers have concerns about rules for 
attributing episodes to a particular provider, how to allocate episode costs across multiple 
physicians who treat the patient during an episode, the adequacy of the risk adjuster, and what 
constitutes an episode of care.  Nonetheless, this effort provides the first systematic attempt to 
capture the variation across individual physicians and distribute the information to physicians.  
The tools to measure these efficiency differences can be refined over time.  
The motivation for this RUR project is the hope that this information will lead physicians to re-
examine their practice patterns (referrals, use of hospitals, use of expensive testing) and that 
high-utilizing outliers will begin to conform more to the norm.  However, given the financial 
incentives currently in place for physicians to practice inefficiently, CMS may wish to use this 
methodology not only for reporting to physicians about their practice patterns but also for setting 
payments to physicians.  The evidence is weak that simply providing the information will 
compel physicians to change their practice patterns.22  Thus, for the program to be effective 
payment mechanisms and financial incentives will be needed to ensure that providers either 
change their practices in ways that conserve resources while maintaining or improving quality, or 
that they are reimbursed only the amount that an efficient provider would have been paid, 
regardless of the excess services they provide or order. 
The “pay-for-efficiency” approach suggested here differs importantly from the typical pay-for-
performance approaches, which focus on reducing variation in the quality of care by tying 
payments to physicians or practices to their performance on quality–of-care indicators.  As noted 
above, the link between improvement on such indicators and cost reductions is unproven and in 
some cases is likely to increase net costs, due to false positives or aggressive treatment of 
problems unlikely to be real health threats.23  Thus, while it will be important to ensure that 
quality of care does not decline in the pursuit of efficiency, improvement in quality indicators 
alone would not increase a physician’s compensation under this approach. 
What specific opportunities should be pursued? 
Generating savings by reducing the need for hospitalizations for beneficiaries with chronic 
illnesses and reducing hospital readmissions requires the enactment of policies that build on the 
hard, scientific evidence about what works for these beneficiaries, who account for a significant 
amount of total Medicare spending.  The challenge will be in disseminating these interventions 
more broadly and making sure that they are defined thoroughly so that they can be replicated 
faithfully and paid for in a manner that generates net savings to Medicare, while improving 
patient outcomes.  This in turn will require creative use of incentives.  Realizing the unproven 
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but vast potential for savings through reducing differences between physicians in service use 
patterns requires improving information collection and dissemination and creating the proper 
financing incentives for all physicians and hospitals.
Four conditions should be kept in mind when setting these policies:  
y First, improvement in quality of care (as measured by quality of life, patient satisfaction, 
processes of care, or even clinical indicators) does not necessarily result in lower health 
care costs.  Unless these changes are accompanied by a reduction in the cost of care 
(through more efficient use of healthcare resources, less redundancy, or most importantly, 
less need for hospitalizations), paying more for such improvements in quality may make 
patients happier but will increase overall costs.  To cover the cost of interventions and 
generate the kind of real net savings needed, policies need to be focused on changes that 
improve quality of care in ways that will reduce the need for expensive hospital, post-
acute care, and specialist care.   
y Second, most programs will take time to show cost savings.  Promoting policy changes 
that are based on rigorous evidence and providing extensive detail on how such 
interventions were effectively implemented can greatly shorten that time, but as new 
entities adopt these practices, it will take time for them to learn how to adapt 
interventions to their settings.   
y Third, multifaceted approaches are needed to: (1) enable and drive providers of all types 
in all types of organizations to change their behavior in ways that improve the efficiency 
of health care, and (2) enable and impel patients to change their self-care practices and 
behaviors in ways that are likely to reduce their need for expensive health care.
y Fourth, rather than proceeding to do something quickly that is untested on a national 
basis, new policies should be tested with rigorous methodologies from the start to 
monitor whether they are working, where they are working best, and why, so 
policymakers can be assured that they have made sound choices or can learn from past 
mistakes and move quickly in a more productive direction. 
With these conditions in mind, the following specific policy changes or initiatives seem to offer 
the most promise for generating real net savings for Medicare in the next three to five years: 
Reducing Hospitalizations and Hospital Readmissions for Beneficiaries with Chronic Illnesses
y Implement a large, broad-based coordinated care pilot to test whether other organizations 
can achieve the same success as the best-practice interventions that generated significant 
reductions in hospitalizations in four demonstration program sites for a specific high-risk 
population (beneficiaries with one or more of three major chronic illnesses—coronary 
artery disease, congestive heart failure, or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease—and a 
hospitalization in the past year, plus beneficiaries with any of 12 chronic illnesses and 
two or more hospitalizations in the past two years).  The new pilot sites would focus on 
only this target population and would be required to implement the protocol developed by 
the effective sites, to maximize the likelihood that their interventions are faithful to the 
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proven interventions.  The findings from the pilot would then guide the establishment of a 
permanent care coordination benefit under Medicare that has been proven to generate net 
savings and to be replicable in various settings. 
y Concurrent with this pilot, maintain an ongoing “learning laboratory” of care 
coordination programs to conduct rapid turnaround testing of variations in the proven 
interventions.  These variations could be implemented and tested far more quickly than 
the normal demonstration process allows and could provide valuable guidance to 
organizations of all types on ways to increase the impacts on hospitalizations and lower 
the cost of the effective care coordination interventions, both of which would increase net 
savings to Medicare.
y Modify the Medicare medical home demonstration so that it is targeted to only the subset 
of beneficiaries who are most likely to benefit from care coordination—that is, the high-
risk population identified in the care coordination demonstrations—and require that 
medical homes incorporate the lessons learned from the demonstrations about how to 
implement an effective care coordination intervention.  Set the payment rates to medical 
homes for this population at a level that is expected to generate net savings.  Current 
estimates suggest that a rate of $145 per beneficiary per month for this high-risk group 
could generate net savings to CMS, if the medical homes are as effective as the four best 
care coordination demonstration programs. 
y Vary the base rate paid to hospitals for Medicare admissions to reward those with low 
readmission rates and penalize those with high readmission rates (properly adjusting for 
case mix).  Provide guidance to hospitals on how to achieve lower readmission rates, 
through feeding back data analyses to diagnose the major sources of the high rates as well 
as referring the hospitals to experts who have developed and tested effective transitional 
care interventions. 
Reducing Regional Disparities Across Physicians and Areas in Efficiency and Quality 
y Refine and extend the Resource Use Reporting program to all Medicare physicians 
nationally.  Under this program, physicians will be made aware of how their patients’ 
Medicare costs and practice patterns differ from those of their peers locally, statewide, 
and nationally.  Provide quality of care indicators, such as complications, readmissions, 
deaths, preventable hospitalizations, and other quality indicators that have clear and near-
term cost implications.  Publicize the aggregate findings annually to show differences in 
levels and trends across major metropolitan areas and states, for urban versus rural areas, 
and for the country as a whole.  Develop and publicize plans to base payments to 
physicians on their efficiency and quality measures. 
Reinstating Incentives for Efficient Provision of Care in the Medicare Advantage (MA) Program
y The structure and incentives for efficient provision of care already exists in the Medicare 
Advantage program.  A recent paper by Anderson suggests that MA plans provide far 
more cost-effective care than traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare.24  Furthermore, 
some Special Needs Plans are focused specifically on beneficiaries with chronic illnesses.  
However, MA only generates savings for the federal government if it can provide care 
more cheaply than FFS Medicare through greater efficiency and cost control.
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Furthermore, Medicare’s previous attempts to save money by paying 95 percent of 
expected FFS rates actually resulted in losses, because the risk adjusters did not 
adequately account for the favorable selection experienced by HMOs.  The current risk 
adjustor is much more refined and does account for favorable selection on chronic 
conditions.  However, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) 
estimates that CMS currently pays MA plans about $12 billion (14 percent) more per year 
than what it would cost to serve these beneficiaries in FFS, as a result of setting base rates 
far above fee-for-service levels.  MedPAC therefore recommends saving this full amount 
by setting rates at 100 percent of expected FFS costs.  Paying 98 percent of expected FFS 
costs could generate additional savings to CMS of $1.7 billion per year at 2009 MA 
enrollment levels, thus returning the MA program to its conceptual origins as a strategy to 
promote better and more efficiently managed care.  (H.R. 3200 would phase down 
payments to 100 percent of expected FFS expenditures to achieve savings of $156 billion 
over ten years, consistent with the MedPAC recommendation).
Saving health care dollars through these approaches means some health care providers and 
insurers will lose money.  Being upfront about this fact may facilitate an open discussion of the 
costs and benefits of these reforms.  For some of the suggested policy changes, such as reducing 
per capita payments to Medicare Advantage plans to expected fee-for-service expenditures (or 
less), it may be obvious who loses.  However, it should also be acknowledged that reducing 
disparities among providers means that physicians who practice a more resource-intensive style 
of care will make less money, just as tying base payment amounts to hospitals to their 
readmission rates means hospitals with high readmissions will lose money. Adding care 
coordination as a Medicare benefit would yield savings by reducing hospital use and revenue, as 
well as the post-acute care that follows many hospital admissions.  A clear explanation of where 
savings are coming from will lend credibility to the estimates and could generate greater public 
support for the changes. 
In addition to these policies with short-run savings potential, the groundwork should be laid for 
more sweeping changes that have the potential to improve the efficiency and quality of health 
care over the longer term.  The approaches with the greatest potential include: 
y Reduce the enormous differences in efficiency across providers between and within 
geographic areas by tying payments to physicians to their RUR ratings and quality of 
care, rewarding those who provide care most efficiently while providing care of average 
or better quality, and penalizing those associated with the least efficient care or poor 
quality.  Some learning period will be needed before fully implementing this major 
payment reform. 
y Implement a national Medicare care coordination benefit that builds on the findings from 
the demonstration.  Such a benefit could reduce hospitalizations by 12 percent each year 
among this high-risk population and generate annual net savings of $2.8 billion, even if 
no additional savings are achieved from learning that has occurred throughout the 
demonstration or from ongoing efforts to provide detailed protocols to facilitate 
replication of the most effective interventions.25  A range of methods of financing such a 
benefit should be considered.  While putting participating organizations at risk for their 
fees if they do not generate savings sounds appealing, many academic medical centers 
and other non-profit delivery systems have organizational constraints that prohibit them 
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from entering into risk-bearing agreements.  However, evidence to date from several 
CMS demonstrations suggests that such organizations are far more likely to be able to 
generate savings than the large commercial disease management providers.  Thus, work 
must be done on the types of organizations that would be authorized to receive 
compensation for providing care coordination, and how that compensation would be 
structured.  A conservative approach would be to require that any organization wishing to 
be a certified Medicare coordinated care provider go through a two-year pilot phase in 
which they must prove they are able to generate savings using the approved model. 
y Continue to move forward with electronic health records development.  Some of the most 
crucial aspects are having a common platform that ensures that providers with different 
systems would be able to input, output, and share EHRs easily, having a summary format 
that displays the most salient information to providers in a very user-friendly and 
expedient fashion, and linking EHR information to best practice guidelines to generate 
queries and suggestions for providers to consider.
y Conduct rigorous studies wherever possible to compare the relative effectiveness of 
alternative interventions that vary substantially in their costs.  Use large enough samples 
where possible to examine subgroups of patients in order to assess variations in what 
works best for different types of individuals.  Perform the studies in multiple settings and 
places to ensure generalizability, observe the variations in impacts, and determine the 
barriers that some areas or organizations face to successful implementation of the 
intervention. 
y Continue to seek ways to improve end-of-life care to maximize the comfort and quality of 
life in the last months of life for terminally ill patients and their families while limiting 
the use of expensive procedures and treatments that have no potential to meaningfully 
increase survival time.  Conduct a study similar to the RUR program to calculate, 
compare, and feed back information to physicians and hospitals on the end-of-life 
experiences of their patients relative to those of other providers in the community, state, 
and nation. 
The suggestions above, like any others, do not guarantee that the Medicare spending growth rate 
will fall to sustainable levels in the near term.  However, they are based on what the hard 
evidence to date suggests are the options most likely to succeed at generating Medicare savings, 
beyond simple across-the-board reductions in provider payment rates; they are not based on 
wishful thinking or purely theoretical models.  Implementing the above changes should help get 
Medicare moving toward savings by reducing costs for the highest-risk beneficiaries, by 
reducing hospital readmissions, and by beginning to reduce geographic disparities between 
physicians in spending and care delivery, while developing a health care delivery system that 
leads to lower future costs and improved quality of care. 
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APPENDIX A 
Evaluating Savings from the Community Care of North Carolina (CCNC) Program 
The methodology in the analysis to evaluate savings from implementing the CCNC program in 
North Carolina’s Medicaid program, conducted by Mercer, consists of comparing actual costs 
under CCNC for 2004-2006 to benchmarks based on estimates of what costs would have been 
under fee for service.  The benchmarks were created by projecting trends in cost per participant 
per month by type of service from the 2000-2002 period forward to the 2004-2006 period, then 
multiplying by the number of CCNC participants in 2004, 2005, and 2006 to get the benchmark 
by type of service for each year.  The benchmark rates were adjusted for programmatic changes 
in 2006, such as the inclusion of newly eligible populations, the impact of the Medicare Part D 
prescription drug benefit, and a change in reimbursement for disproportionate share hospital 
(DSH) payments.  Actual cost data were adjusted for pharmacy rebates, third-party liability 
recoveries, cost settlements and fraud and abuse recoveries. The methodology for calculating the 
trend rates, the trend rate actually used, and the effects of the various adjustments and how they 
were made were not described, yet each may have critical implications for the size and 
credibility of the estimates.   
The findings from Mercer’s evaluation of CCNC also raise some concerns about the plausibility 
and generalizability of the savings estimates.  For example, 70 percent of the savings in 2005 
($158 million) were for inpatient costs, which were cut almost in half, according to the estimates.  
This rate of “savings” on hospital costs far exceeds any rigorous estimate for any other 
intervention ever tested on a large population.  Furthermore, when the results were broken down 
by age group, over half of the savings were for infants age one year or less, again due to a greater 
than 50 percent reduction in per member per month (pmpm) cost, although how such huge 
effects were obtained is not explained.  Even if this were a credible estimate, it is unclear if such 
savings could be replicated in a Medicare population.
A second set of estimates provided by Mercer raises even more suspicions about the plausibility 
of these estimates.  When the benchmark is constructed solely from the state’s managed care 
sector in 2000-2002, the estimated savings are: (1) about one-third the size of savings based on 
the comparison to the fee-for-service sector, (2) due primarily to outpatient and physician 
services rather than hospitalizations, and (3) distributed across various age groups rather than 
being concentrated in infants.  While the magnitude of these alternative Mercer estimates are 
more credible than the primary estimates, they suffer from the same lack of clear exposition of 
the methodology, and are inherently heavily dependent on a wide range of undocumented 
assumptions that have not been subjected to tests of robustness. 
The very low cost cited for the CCNC program, given the difficulty of actually improving the 
coordination of care or treatment of chronic illnesses, raises questions about the plausibility of 
these savings estimates, and the replicability of the results in other locations.  
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